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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) embraces the interconnec-
tion of identifiable devices that are capable of providing services
through their cooperation. The cooperation among devices in
such an IoT environment often requires reliable and trusted
participating members in order to provide useful services to
the end user. Consequently, an IoT environment or space needs
to evaluate the trust levels of all devices in contact before
admitting them as members of the space. Existing trust evaluation
models are based on resources such as historical observations or
recommendations information to evaluate the trust level of a
device. However, these methods fail if there is no existing trust
resource. This paper introduces a specific IoT environment called
personal space IoT and proposes a novel trust evaluation model
that performs a challenge-response trust assessment to evaluate
the trust level of a device before allowing it to participate in
the space. This novel challenge-response trust assessment model
does not require the historical observation or previous encounter
with the device or any existing trusted recommendation. The
proposed challenge-response trust assessment model provides a
reliable trust resource that can be used along with other resources
such as direct trust, recommendation trust to get a comprehensive
trust opinion on a specific device. It can also be considered as a
new method for evaluating the trust value on a device.
I. INTRODUCTION
A broad definition of IoT entails a number of smart entities
that are identifiable through unique addresses, have ability to
sense their surroundings, connect to the Internet, and interact
with one other to achieve the goals of a particular application
[1]. Simply, we view IoT as the interconnection of identifiable
and smart objects capable of providing services. These objects
are known as devices with unique identifications.
The interconnection and communication ability of these
objects enable IoT applications in numerous domains from
industry, society to the environment [2]. The scope of an
IoT space can be limited to a local sensing system or cover
a global monitoring network. It is impossible to discuss
an IoT application without defining the perimeter of the
IoT space. This paper introduces a particular IoT space,
the personal space IoT .
Definition of personal space IoT The personal space IoT
centers on a person’s space. It includes all objects implanted
or wearable by the person such as implanted sensors, smart
watches, Google glasses, ECG sensors, and smartphones. It
also includes all fixed or mobile objects and devices that
come into contact (or reachable) with wearable objects on
the person. Devices are reachable when they are within the
wireless transmission radius of one another. The radius is
technology and energy dependent (Bluetooth, Zigbee, etc). In
this personal space IoT, some devices work together and form
their own IoT space so that the space can provide services to
the owner. Some devices may belong to other personal space
IoT and are able to exchange services with other personal
spaces. Others may stand alone and may interfere maliciously
with other reachable personal spaces.
This work focuses on the personal space IoT. The focus is
on a group of devices associated with the personal space of
a person and provides services to the owner. These devices
are supposed to be carried or worn by the owner. Keeping in
mind that all these wearable devices are small and powered
by battery, optimized energy consumption is critical in their
operation. In our focused personal space IoT, we designate one
of the devices called the controller to manage activities within
the personal space IoT on behalf of other devices within. The
devices in the personal space IoT are able to interconnect with
each other and connect to surrounding devices or the Internet
all through the controller.
In practice, the personal space operates within a large envi-
ronment with multiple surrounding devices. These surrounding
devices are called as foreign devices. The foreign devices can
also form other personal spaces IoT for their own purposes.
In the focused personal space IoT’s point of view, the foreign
devices can be friends, strangers or even intruders. In addition,
the focused personal space IoT can move around as the owner
moves. Thereby, the focused personal space co-exists with
other personal spaces which may contain the friends, strangers
or intruders in a specific environment. In fact, we model
a personal space IoT as a “smart software Personal Space
IoT object” that has its own identity and characteristics, is
dynamic and mobile, and interacts with other personal space
IoT objects.
Due to the co-existence with other devices in a common
environment, the focused personal space IoT may suffer from
the harmful interactions of the foreign devices. Besides, the
malicious devices may try to join the space and work to
destroy our personal space. Also, the focused personal space
may be tracked by the intruders and strangers. Therefore, the
personal space IoT has to be able to protect itself from all
harmful activities in the environment.
In order to protect its personal space IoT, the controller
plays a central role looking after its elements just like a
person’s brain which acts as a commanding centre managing
and protecting all parts of a person. In particular, the controller
needs to be able to recognize and classify all the devices within
reach into separate categories: its own devices, admissible and
inadmissible devices. The controller only allows the trusted
devices to be the member of the personal space. However, it
permits other nearby devices to exchange useful information
and services with the personal space if they are trusted.
Otherwise, the devices are untrusted intruders and do not have
the permission to join the personal space IoT. In order to do
so, a trust evaluation scheme is needed.
Existing trust models are based on some trust resources
such as the experience of a previous encounter between two
entities (subject and agent), the direct observations between
them in the past, and the recommendations from nearby third
parties. Some trust models used the combination of these
resources. The disadvantage of these existing methods is that
they require the experience of a node on another (a subject
on its agent) and/or the presence of the third parties for
recommendations. However, in most realistic situations, the
subject has no experience on the agent or in situations where
nearby third parties are not able to make the recommendation
due to the lack of information about the agent or dynamic
changes in the environment. In these situations, alternative
trust models are needed. In this paper, we propose a novel trust
evaluation method - the challenge-response trust assessment
model for personal space IoT.
Our trust evaluation scheme uses a trust assessment whereby
the controller tests all the discovered devices and evaluates the
trust degree on each device before making a decision whether
to accept it to its personal space. The trust evaluation method is
numerical - based trust which uses the conditional probability
throughout the trust assessment and the associated entropy to
measure the uncertainty about the device. Finally, the entropy
is translated to the trust degree that the controller places on
the device.
The proposed trust evaluation scheme can be used together
with existing methods to provide additional trust evidence
for the decision making. It can also be used as a separate
trust evaluation component of the trust management models to
evaluate the trust value on a specific device. The main benefit
of our proposed trust evaluation model is that it can be used
for all situations without relying on the historical experience
or the recommendations.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses the related work. Section III describes our
challenge-response trust assessment model. The calculation
of trust value is presented in section IV. Section V presents
the experimental results on the consistency of the trust value.
Finally, section VI gives the conclusion remarks along with
directions for future research.
II. RELATED WORK
In [3], the authors proposed a trust evaluation model as
a path problem on a directed graph where nodes represent
entities and edges represent trust relations. The indirect trust
relation between two users is established by using the second-
hand information from a third party. Thus, their trust model
needs direct trust relations between the third entity and one of
the two users. Also, there is no mechanism to guarantee that
the third entity is a trusted recommender.
The authors of [4] proposed a distributed-based framework
whereby the trust parameters are observed via the information
transmission. A node can compute the trust level of its
neighbors based on observation of their past behavior. This
approach requires the historical experience of the subject on
the agent before evaluating the trust level on this agent.
Varadharajan et al., in [5] presented a trust evaluation model
in a peer-to-peer environment whereby the trust value of an
unknown peer is determined by investigating its historical
interaction with other peers. A requesting peer relies on both
its historical interactions and its friend’s recommendations
to collect the trust opinion on a target peer. The limitation
is that the requesting peer highly depends on its neighbor
peers’ recommendation if it has no historical interactions
with its target peer. Therefore, the number of neighbors and
their interactions with the target peers, and the quality of
recommendations affects the accuracy of the achieved trust
value.
The authors of [6] suggested a new method of measuring
trust value through measuring uncertainty. This work demon-
strated that trust can be measured by determining the degree
of uncertainty in the future action of an agent. The trust
value can then be obtained from the amount of uncertainty
which is measured by its information entropy. However, this
approach depends solely on third party’s recommendations.
Moreover, applying the trust propagation in this concatenation
of recommendation fashion results in a degradation of the
trust value when a series of recommenders are deployed in
tandem away from the target object. The reason is that the
concatenation propagation of trust does not increase trust [6].
Existing trust models rely either on the direct experiences
in the past or the interaction of recommenders to evaluate the
trust value an entity places on another. Our challenge-response
trust assessment scheme adopts a push model whereby a
challenge is initiated and a trust assessment procedure is per-
formed to obtain the trust value without the need for historical
interactions or recommendations. Therefore, the dependency
on the third entities is eliminated and the trusting subject can
control the trust assessment adaptively to specific situations.
III. CHALLENGE-RESPONSE TRUST ASSESSMENT MODEL
This section describes our challenge-response trust assess-
ment model. The proposed model is accomplished by a trust
assessment with a challenge-response process. The purpose
of the assessment is to learn how much uncertainty is in
the device’s response. The uncertainty is measured with the
associated information entropy and then interpreted to the trust
value.
Generally, the trust relationship between two entities can
be expressed as {Subject: Agent, Action} whereby Subject
is the entity that performs trust evaluation, and Agent is the
entity that trust is evaluated on its action. Information entropy
has been used as the measurement of uncertainty in a signal
or a random event [7]. Trust opinion can be interpreted from
the level of uncertainty about a specific person or thing. A
subject can decide to trust or distrust an agent by assessing
the uncertainty in the action of the agent. The full trust degree
and complete distrust degree are only interpreted from the
fact that there is no longer uncertainty in the action of the
agent. Otherwise, the trust degree is transferred to a neutral,
a more trust or more distrust value depending on how much
uncertainty still remains in the action.
Due to the relation of the trust definition and information
entropy with the uncertainty concept, the trust value can be
measured via entropy. Our challenge-response trust assessment
model is a probability-based model based on the one-to-one
relationship between the probability of an event and the trust
on it. The information entropy is computed based on the event
probability and then translated to a trust value.
In our proposed model, the controller plays the role of the
subject while the device under assessment is the agent. The
device will be tested by the controller with challenges. Thus,
the action expected from a device is to respond to the challenge
correctly in the controller’s point of view. The trust value is
depicted as a real number in the [-1, 1] interval whereby the
trust values range from a complete distrust over neutral trust
measure to a full trust as shown in Fig. 1.
The trust assessment contains a number of challenges that
the controller requests responses from the device. The chal-
lenge can be a question that requires the devices provide
correct answer. It can also be the command that the controller
needs the devices to perform. The type of challenge depends
on the application that the personal space IoT supports. Each
challenge followed by a response can be considered as a stage
of the assessment. In each stage, the response of the device
may or may not be accepted by the controller depending on
whether it satisfies the controller. After each stage, the con-
troller can measure how much uncertain is in device’s behavior
by assessing the response. The uncertainty is measured via
entropy which is computed based on conditional probabilities.
During the trust assessment, the controller gradually learns the
behavior of the device.
The base of uncertainty measurement is the probability.
The associated probability for measuring the uncertainty of a
device in our trust assessment refers to the probability that an
expected device provides expected responses to the challenge.
In fact, the controller may trust on the context of a given
response at a certain degree. Meanwhile, the device provided
a given response may or may not be the expected device.
Consequently, the associated probability with the uncertainty
of a device relies on the probability the controller trusts on
a given response and the probability that the device provided
this response is the expected device.
The mapping between the probability and the trust value
is one-to-one. If there is a high probability that an expected
response comes to the controller from a device, it is more
likely that the device will be trusted. Likewise, when this
probability is very low, it is more likely that the device will
be distrusted. The higher the probability, the more trust the
controller places on the device.
In order to calculate the associated probability with which
the uncertainty can be measured, we design two conditional
probabilities. Firstly, we take into account the probability that
the controller trust on the context of a given response. If
the response is an expected response to the controller, it is
more likely that the device which provided this response is the
expected device. Otherwise, if the response does not satisfy the
requirement of the controller for a specific challenge, it is more
likely that the device is not the expected device. Therefore, the
second conditional probability is the probability that the device
is the expected device given that it provided an expected or
an unexpected response.
The associated probability expressed how much the con-
troller trust on a specific device is computed based on two
conditional probability components. The calculation of this
probability is presented in section IV. The uncertainty will be
measured from this probability via entropy function and then
interpreted to trust value. The measurement and interpretation
process is performed after each stage and the overall trust
value is derived from the trust values of the stages.
In practice, the device which provides an expected response
may not be the expected device. On the other hand, the
device which provides an unexpected response may not be
a malicious intruder as the device may make a mistake during
the trust assessment procedure. Our trust assessment provides
chances for a device to recover and improve its trust value.
Likewise, the trust assessment stops when a device presents
a response indicates that the trust is unlikely to recover in
future stages. In addition, the trust assessment will be stopped
whenever the trust value reaches a given acceptable threshold.
IV. TRUST VALUE CALCULATION
In this section, we discuss the uncertainty measurement and
its interpretation to the trust value.
Firstly, the calculation of the probability associated with
the trust relationship between the controller and a device is
presented. Let pCRi denote the probability that the controller
trusts a given response ith, pDRi denote the probability that the
device is considered as the expected device at the ith response.
We also define pRi as the probability that the response is
expected, pD|Ri=1 as the probability that the device is an
expected device given its response is an expected response,
and pD|Ri=0 as the probability that the device is an expected
device given its response is an unexpected response. Then, the
probability associated with the trust relationship between the
controller and a specific device after stage ith, pCD, can be
calculated as:
pCD = pRi · pD|Ri=1 + (1− pRi) · pD|Ri=0 (1)
As the controller can evaluate the response, it is reasonable
for the controller to assume that pRi = pCRi and pD|Ri=1 =
pDRi . In addition, if a device provides an unexpected response
then there is a low probability that it can be considered as ex-
pected device. Thus, we can calculate pD|Ri=0 by subtracting
pD|Ri=1 from 1. Consequently, (1) becomes
pCD = pCRi · pDRi + (1− pCRi) · (1− pDRi) (2)
The associated probability is then used to measure the
uncertainty about the device’s behavior. Information entropy is
the measurement of the uncertainty. By interpreting the amount
of uncertainty to the trust value through entropy, the controller
will be able to decide to trust or distrust the device to a specific
trust degree. We measure the uncertainty about the device’s
behavior by using the Shannon entropy [7]:
H(p) = −p · log(p)− (1− p) · log(1− p) (3)
where, p is the associated probability of the trust relationship
between the controller and the device.
The purpose behind our trust assessment is to reduce the
uncertainty about a device of which the controller has no
knowledge at the initial of the assessment. After the trust
assessment, the controller learns more about the device and
it is able to place the trust value on the device by transferring
the uncertainty level to the trust value.
In fact, the trust is an increasing function of the probability.
Specifically, the trust value is increased when the associated
probability is increasing from 0 to 1. However, the entropy is a
symmetric function of probability. It is a non-negative quantity
and it reaches maximum value at 1 when the probability is
0.5, minimum value at 0 when the probability is at 0 or 1 as
indicated in Fig. 1.
Specifically, the maximal entropy implies the highest un-
certainty about the device so that the controller cannot make
a decision to trust or distrust the device. Therefore, the trust
value is a neutral trust measure and is interpreted to 0. On the
side with probabilities lower than 0.5, the uncertainty about
the device reduces when the probability decreases. It reaches 0
at the probability of 0, and obviously, there is certain that the
device will not provide an expected response. Thus, the trust
value should be translated to -1 which refers to a complete
distrust opinion of the controller. Likewise, on the opposite
side, the uncertainty reduces when the probability increasing
from 0.5 to 1. It reaches 0 at the probability of 1. This implies
that there is certain that the device will provide an expected
response. Therefore, the trust value should be interpreted to
1 which refers to a full trust opinion of the controller on
the device. Fig. 1 shows the entropy and the trust value as
functions of the probability.
In order to interpret the entropy of the device at each stage
to the trust value, (4) is used as it satisfies all the requirements
of the trust value translation.
T =
{
1−H(p), if 0.5 ≤ p ≤1
H(p)− 1, if 0 ≤ p <0.5 (4)
During the trust assessment, the trust value is measured
after each challenge-response stage. The overall trust value
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Fig. 1. Entropy and Trust value with associated probability
is aggregated up to the last stage by combining the previous
trust values with the latest trust value.
T ovrj = ωi · T ovri + ωj · T indj (5)
where, T ovri and T
ovr
j are the overall trust after stage i
th and
stage jth, respectively; T indj is the individual trust after stage
jth; ωi and ωj are the weights for the overall trust value after
i stages (from first stage to ith stage) and for the individual
trust value at jth stage, respectively, and ωi + ωj = 1.
The weights allow us to take into account various considera-
tions such as the environment in which the personal space IoT
operates and the emphasis of different stages of the challenge-
response process. For example, the trust value of a stage may
weight more than that of the previous stage to reflect the
degree of knowledge gained through the assessment process.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the experiment setup and discuss
the obtained results with our proposed scheme.
In the experiments, it is assumed that the controller places
trust on the context of the response. The device provides
an expected response is likely to be trusted as an expected
device with a high probability value. Likewise, the device
provides an unexpected response is likely to be trusted as
an expected device with a very low probability value. The
assigned probability is assumed to increase if an expected
response follows another expected response and to decrease if
an unexpected response follows another unexpected response.
The weight assigning for the trust value at each stage can
be flexibly assigned. Our experiments focus mainly on the
feasibility and consistency of the proposed scheme.
In the following experiments, we assume 0.98 as the proba-
bility that the controller trusts the response, 0.9 or greater is the
probability that the device is the expected device conditioned
on an expected response. The weight assigned to the trust of
the latest challenge is 0.6 and for the previous challenge is
0.4. The distrust and trust threshold values with which the
trust assessment stops are -0.8 and 0.8, respectively.
In the first experiment, we conduct a trust assessment with
two challenges. There are four cases in this experiment. In the
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Fig. 2. Experiment 1: Entropy and Trust values with two expected responses
first case, a device under the trust assessment provides both
expected responses. In the second case, a device provides an
expected response at the first challenge and an unexpected
response at the second challenge. The third case considers
a device which provides an unexpected response at the first
challenge and an expected response at the second challenge.
In the last case, a device provides both unexpected responses
in the trust assessment.
The figures show the entropy, the individual trust value
computed after each challenge, and the overall trust value
which is aggregated from challenges including the previous
challenges and the considering challenge. Fig. 2 shows the
obtained results of the first case. The entropy is reduced
during the trust assessment. Specifically, the entropy is about
0.37 after the first challenge. It reduced to 0.2 after the
second challenge. Due to the reducing of the entropy and the
responses are expected, the associated trust value after each
challenge is increased from 0.64 to 0.80. However, the overall
trust value after the trust assessment is only 0.74 because it
takes into account the uncertainty of the device from both
challenges.
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Fig. 3. Experiment 1: Entropy and Trust values with first expected response
followed by an unexpected response
As shown in Fig. 3, the trust value from the second case
is degraded because the unexpected response at the second
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Fig. 4. Experiment 1: Entropy and Trust values with the first unexpected
response followed by an expected response
challenge takes more weight. The overall trust value is higher
than the trust value at the second challenge but it still indicates
the distrust opinion of the controller. On the contrary, Fig.
4 shows that the trust value is recovered as the device
provides an expected response at the second challenge after
an unexpected response at the first challenge. The overall trust
value is lower than the trust value at the second challenge but
it also indicates the trust opinion.
Fig. 5 shows the consistency of the entropy values with the
trust values in the fourth case. The entropy is reduced over
the assessment and the trust value is degraded as the device
provides both unexpected responses.
It is interesting to discuss the characteristic of the overall
trust value. The overall trust value combines individual trust
values according to the weights assigned to them. By using
the weights, the overall trust value takes into account the trust
values from all challenges. Specifically, the overall trust value
of a device is improved if it provides expected responses to
the challenge. Otherwise, the overall trust value is reduced if
the device provides unexpected responses to the challenge.
In order to see how the threshold affects the trust assess-
ment procedure, the second experiment is performed. This
experiment conducts a trust assessment with no fixed number
of challenges. We present two cases: the device provides all
expected responses in the first case, and the device provides
all unexpected responses in the second case.
In the first case, all the responses are expected responses.
Thus, the probability that the device is an expected device
increases after each challenge. The overall trust value reaches
the trust threshold after four challenges as shown in Fig.
6. Therefore, the trust assessment stops without performing
further challenges.
Fig. 7 shows the obtained results from the second case
of experiment 2. As the responses are unexpected from the
initial of the assessment, the overall trust value is degraded to
a distrust threshold after the third challenge. Then, the trust
assessment stops after three first challenges. According to the
two cases in experiment 2, the trust assessment can converge
after a specific amount of time.
Chal_1 Chal_2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Challenge
E
nt
ro
py
 a
nd
 T
ru
st
 v
al
ue
s
Entropy
Ind. Trust
Ovr. Trust
Fig. 5. Experiment 1: Entropy and Trust values with two unexpected responses
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Fig. 6. Experiment 2: Entropy and Trust values with all expected responses
The main emphasis of the experiments is to show that the
proposed scheme is feasible as an alternative/supplementary
scheme for trust evaluation and to demonstrate that it is
consistent in the way we evaluate trust. Clearly, without direct
observations or the presence of a recommender, the proposed
scheme can initiate a challenge and then evaluate the response
to obtain an informed trust assessment as shown by the results.
While, in the recommendation scheme, the trust value does
not increase with the concatenation of recommendation and
this is consistent and expected since the overall entropy of the
system increases with the additional recommendation. For our
scheme, trust level should increase with additional expected
responses and decrease with unexpected responses. The con-
sistency of the proposed scheme has been demonstrated. There
are many interesting factors to be explored in the design of
the proposed scheme as they are pertinent to and dependent
on the specific environment and objective of the application.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper introduced the concept of a personal space IoT
and described the proposed challenge-response trust assess-
ment model for this personal space IoT. In the trust assessment,
the device is tested with challenges from the controller. This
model does not require the historical interaction between two
Chal_1 Chal_2 Chal_3
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Challenge
E
nt
ro
py
 a
nd
 T
ru
st
 v
al
ue
s
Entropy
Ind. Trust
Ovr. Trust
Fig. 7. Experiment 2: Entropy and Trust values with all unexpected responses
entities or the recommendations of third parties. The trust as-
sessment measures the uncertainty about the device’s behavior
via entropy and then translates the associated entropy to trust
value. The experimental results demonstrated the consistency
of the model in that the achieved trust values can be gained or
degraded during the trust assessment depending on the device’s
response. The challenge-response process allows the controller
to assess the uncertainty or entropy of a device’s behavior and
allows it to make an informed trust/distrust decision on the
device.
For future research, we plan to explore comprehensively
various parameters of the proposed model and to develop
a trust management framework that combines our trust as-
sessment scheme with existing models. The comprehensive
trust management framework will be robust and able to
adapt to various operational environments as the direct trust,
the indirect trust and the challenge-response trust assessment
schemes can be used simultaneously to improve the accuracy
of the evaluation.
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